This article recalls the state of play of inequality levels and trends in OECD countries, with a special focus on Nordic countries. It sheds light on explaining the drivers of the rise in inequality and its economic consequences. It addresses in particular the issue of redistribution through taxes and transfers. It concludes with an overview of policy packages that should be considered to address the issue of rising inequalities.
Introduction
Income inequality has been on the rise for three decades in OECD countries, raising political concerns at the highest level. Nordic countries, although with no doubt among the countries most equal in terms of income in the OECD, have not been an exception to the rule. High and rising inequality harms our societies in many respects. It can hamper social cohesion, trust in institutions, result in lost opportunities and hurt economic growth.
Inequality is not only about juxtaposing 'the rich' and 'the poor' in terms of wages or incomes. The phenomenon involves accumulated wealth or debts, but it also has to do with health status, quality of jobs and education. A good understanding of this complex web of factors is crucial in designing appropriate policies, ranging from labour market and education policies to redistribution policies, that will be best able to address the issue of rising inequalities.
This article examines the state of play of inequality levels and trends in OECD countries, with a special focus on Nordic countries. It sheds light on explaining the drivers of the rise in inequality and its economic consequences. It addresses in particular the issue of redistribution through taxes and transfers. It concludes with an overview of policy packages that should be considered to address the issue of rising inequalities.
Inequality is at an historical high in most OECD countries
Over the past three decades, income inequality has risen in most OECD countries, reaching in some cases historical highs. The Gini coefficient, a common measure of income inequality that scores 0 when everybody has identical incomes and 1 when all the income goes to only one person, stands at an average of 0.318 in OECD countries, exceeds 0.4 in the United States and Turkey and is approaching 0.5 in Chile and Mexico (Figure 1 ). Nordic countries are more equal than most of OECD countries. Iceland, Norway and Denmark are the most equal OECD countries in 2014. Finland ranks fifth, with Sweden in tenth position.
In the mid-1980s, the Gini coefficient of income inequality stood at 0.29, on average, across OECD countries. By 2014, it had increased by about 10% to 0.32, rising in 17 of the 22 OECD countries for which a long-time series of data are available ( Figure 2 ). All in all, inequality increased in countries with an already historically high level of inequality, such as Mexico or the USA, but it also increased in countries with a low level of inequality. In Sweden, for example, inequality increased from 0.200 in the mid-1980s -a level below the lowest level of inequality today -to 0.281 in 2013, which is close to the level of inequality prevailing in France, for example. Inequality also increased in Norway and Denmark, although to a lesser extent than in Sweden.
Another noticeable shift during the last thirty years pertains to the age profile of poverty, with young people replacing the elderly as the group most at risk of poverty. Poverty rates rose among children (below 18), and especially among youth (aged 18-25), while they fell among the elderly (above 65) ( Figure 3 ). Young people are now more likely to be poor than seniors [3] . Youth poverty rates are particularly high in the Nordic countries, where the young tend to move out earlier than in other countries, so they no longer benefit from their parents' income. They are high in the United States, too, although the population is somewhat younger [3] .
It is not easy to untangle the complex web of factors behind the growing gap between the rich and the poor. Structural changes at play include technological change, increased market integration, institutional changes (product market regulation) Globalisation has been much debated as the main cause of widening inequalities. From a political point of view, protectionist sentiments have been fuelled by the observation that the benefits of productivity gains in the past two decades accrued mainly -in some cases, exclusively -to highly skilled, highly educated workers in OECD countries, leaving people with lower skills struggling. Next to globalisation, there are other equally plausible explanations for the growing inequality in the distribution of market income. Technological progress in particular is often cited. For example, advances in information and communication technology (ICT) are often considered to be skill-biased, and therefore inequality-increasing factors.
labour markets have been profoundly transformed by the interplay of globalisation, technological change and regulatory reforms. These changes have had a major impact on earnings and incomes, the single most important driver of income inequality [4] . People with skills in high-demand sectors such as IT or finance have seen their earnings rise significantly, especially at the very top end of the scale, where performance-based wages and bonuses have become widespread. Meanwhile, at the other end of the scale, wages of workers with low skills have not kept up.
Changes in earnings and in labour market conditions have been identified as the most important direct drivers of rising income inequalities [4] . This is linked, in particular, with changes in the distribution of gross wages and salaries, which have become more dispersed in most OECD countries in the past 25 years. However, it is also linked to changes in employment patterns, working conditions and labour market structures. For instance, growing levels of non-standard work, such as part-time work, casual work and work on temporary contracts, may help to explain the puzzle of increasing inequality despite aggregate employment growth prior to the global economic crisis.
The period has also seen reforms of tax systems that have reduced marginal tax rates for high earners.
In addition, taxes and benefits have tended to redistribute less in the period from the mid-1990s up to the crisis (see below). These factors, along with a number of demographic and social trends, are key to understanding the long-term rise in income inequality in OECD countries [2, 4] .
the impact of the economic crisis on households only partially heals
In 2008, the economic crisis hit many OECD countries, notably in Europe. Unemployment peaked above 8% in 2010 in the OECD area and reached 12% during 2013 in the Euro area [1,5]. Since 2010, GDP and employment resumed growing in the OECD area. The economic recovery has gradually led to improvements in labour markets and household incomes. Some countries, such as Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy and the Baltic States bear the brunt of the crisis more heavily, with unemployment rates sometimes above 20%, and started their recovery later.
So far, the economic recovery has not reversed the trend towards increasing income inequality observed over the past decades. While the recovery since 2010 has improved average incomes, more rapid growth of top incomes combined with weaker improvement at the bottom and at the middle has increased inequalities, although only marginally [1] .
Even in countries where labour market slack has been absorbed, long-term unemployment remains high. low-quality jobs and high disparities in terms of work contracts, sectors of employment and job security also remain a matter of concern. More people are in temporary contracts. Real average wages are still lagging behind. Wages have stagnated and even fallen in countries such as Greece, Ireland, Japan, Portugal, Spain and the Baltic States [5] .
The impact of the crisis on incomes was much stronger on labour income than on disposable income, thanks to the role of redistribution. In the earlier phase of the crisis, taxes and cash transfers largely off-set the increase in market income inequality. Since 2010, redistribution has weakened or stagnated in most OECD countries. This may be due to a softening of automatic stabilisers as the economy recovers in some countries (e.g. in Estonia or latvia), or the phasing out of fiscal stimulus measures implemented in the early years of the crisis (for example, in the United States the extension of the duration of unemployment benefits, carried out in 2008-09, was rolled back in 2011).
Weaker redistribution may also reflect the introduction of fiscal consolidation measures. For instance, redistribution decreased in Hungary when guaranteed minimum incomes and unemployment benefits were tightened; and in Ireland, when direct taxation was reformed and several working-age social benefits were lowered.
Persistent divides in the labour market and lower redistribution constitute challenges for policy. Widening income gaps between rich and poor and high unemployment rates have raised awareness about the need to restore growth, but also to make sure that all groups in society contribute to, and benefit from, greater prosperity.
the consequences of high levels of inequality
High and often growing income inequality in so many countries has renewed interest from policy makers. High levels of inequality can be a matter of concern for ethical reasons (justice), or for political reasons (lack of trust). But high levels of inequality can also be a concern for economic reasons, over and above its impact on social outcomes.
The empirical evidence has until recently been mixed as to which of the opposite forces dominates, and in which country. Research at the OECD [2] finds consistent evidence that the long-term rise in inequality of disposable incomes observed in many OECD countries has indeed put a significant brake on long-term growth. Further, it shows that efforts to reduce inequality through redistribution -typically, certain forms of taxes and benefits -do not lead to slower growth (confirming similar results in [6] ).
The OECD analysis, which draws on data for 31 OECD countries, covering the period 1970-2010, finds that income inequality has a sizeable impact on growth. Between 1985 and 2005, for example, inequality rose by more than 2 Gini points on average across 19 OECD countries (from 0.29 to 0.31), an increase estimated to have knocked 4.7% off cumulative growth between 1990 and 2010 [2] .
The biggest factor found for the impact of inequality on growth is the gap between lower income households and the rest of the population. This is true not just for the very lowest earners -the bottom 10%but for a much broader swathe of low earners -the bottom 40%. Countering the negative effect of inequality on growth is thus not just about tackling poverty but about addressing low incomes more broadly.
The dominant mechanism through which inequality seems to affect growth is by curbing opportunities for the poor and lower middle classes. People whose parents come from low socioeconomic groups do less well at school than people from higher socioeconomic groups. And this is true in at least three areas, namely education attainment, skills and employment.
As inequality rises, the outcomes of people from lower groups decline still further (Figure 4 ). On average, around 40% of people from a high parental education background and around 30% from a medium parental education background graduate from university. These figures remain broadly consistent regardless of the level of inequality. However, this is not the case for children from poorer educated families. An increase in inequality of around six Gini points lowers the probability of poorer people graduating from university by around four points. A similar effect is found when it comes to the amount of time students spend in education. Increasing inequality by around six Gini points cuts the length of time children from poorer families spend in education by about half a year.
The impact of higher income inequality on children from poorly educated families can also be seen in quality of education, by measurements of skills (e.g. indexes of proficiency in numeracy and literacy) drawing from the OECD Skills Survey [7] . Once again, the numbers remain fairly constant for people from high and medium parental educational backgrounds, regardless of the level of inequality, but decline markedly for children from poorer families. This might seem like an obvious follow-on from the previous finding -people from poorer families spend less time in education and therefore develop weaker numeracy and literacy skills. However, the data show that even when poorer people spend the same amount of time in education as their better-off peers they do worse. This suggests that a large part of their lower proficiency is not because they have less education, but rather that they get less out of their time in education. This is probably due to education being of poorer quality, but there may be other social factors as well, such as people from poorer backgrounds being unable to spend the same amount of time studying as their richer counterparts.
the role of redistribution in mitigating inequality
Taxes and transfers are major pillars of an effective policy strategy to curb high inequality. These policies constitute the most direct and powerful instrument to redistribute income. Most OECD countries make substantial use of income taxes and cash transfers to reduce income gaps.
On average across OECD countries, redistribution lowers market income inequality by 27% among the working-age population ( Figure 5 ). OECD countries differ significantly in the extent of redistribution: close to 40% of market income inequality is reduced by redistribution through taxes and cash transfers in Belgium, Finland, Slovenia and Ireland. Meanwhile, redistribution is below 5% in Chile, 8% in Korea, and between 16% and 19% in Japan, Switzerland, Israel and the United States.
The impact of redistribution would be even larger after taking into account the retirement-age population, as well as non-cash public transfers, such as education and health care. Public cash transfers account for, on average, two-thirds of total redistribution across OECD countries. Only in Israel, Chile, Australia and the United States taxes redistribute almost as much as transfers.
Taxes and benefits have tended to redistribute less in the period from the mid-1990s up to the crisis ( Figure 5 ). Until the mid-1990s, tax-benefit systems in many OECD countries offset more than half of the rise in market-income inequality. However, while market-income inequality continued to rise after the mid-1990s, much of the stabilising effect of taxes and benefits on household income inequality declined. The tax-benefit system became less redistributive after the mid-1990s because benefits -one of the three main components of redistribution together with income taxes and social security contributionsbecame less redistributive. Although governments tended to spend more on benefits overall, transfers did not become more progressive. Changes in the numbers of unemployed, and reforms to benefit eligibility criteria, appear to have been particularly important Figure 4 . Average numeracy score conditional on education by parent educational background (PEB) and inequality. Note: The graph plots the average predicted numeracy score for individuals from low, medium and high family (educational) backgrounds, as a function of the degree of inequality (Gini points) in the country at the time they were around 14 years old. low PEB: neither parent has attained upper secondary education; medium PEB: at least one parent has attained secondary and post-secondary, non-tertiary education; high PEB: at least one parent has attained tertiary education. The bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The vertical dashed lines indicate the 25th, the median and the 75th percentiles of the underlying distribution of inequality. Source: OECD [2] . factors, whereas benefit targeting played less of a role. In addition, spending on out-of-work benefits shifted towards 'inactive' benefits, which resulted in reduced activity rates and thus exacerbated the trend towards higher market-income inequality.
Despite the substantial gains of high-income earners in some countries, income taxes played a relatively minor role in moderating trends towards higher inequality. This is because trends towards lower income taxes on the one hand, and more progressive taxation on the other, had opposite effects on redistribution, and partly cancelled each other out.
last but not least, institutional factors such as changes in tax policies have contributed to the rise Figure 5 . For redistribution, public cash transfers play a more important role than taxes. Gini coefficient of market income inequality and disposable income inequality, and impact of taxes and transfers, working-age population, 2014 (or latest year). Notes: The redistributive impact of cash public transfers is measured by the difference between the Gini coefficient of market incomes (with individuals ranked according with their market income per equivalent household member, including cases with zero market incomes) and the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income (i.e. gross income), with individuals ranked according to their pre-tax income, including cases with zero income. The redistributive impact of taxes is measured by the difference between the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income and the Gini coefficient of household disposable income (with individuals ranked according to their disposable household income). In Korea, there is no data available on the separate impact of transfers and taxes, in Hungary, Mexico and Turkey, data on taxes are not available, and all income sources are recorded on a net-of-tax basis. in top incomes and may have also driven the change in compensation practices in turn. During the 'Golden Age' of post-war prosperity, pay norms limited large wage gaps; but these norms have been gradually eroded. At the same time, progressive income and inheritance taxes, which drove a large drop of top income shares between the 1920s and the 1970s, have been substantially reduced in recent decades [8] . While top tax rates were equal to or above 70% in half of the OECD countries in the mid-1970s, this rate had been halved in many countries by the end-2000s.
OECD countries have seen a general reduction in their top statutory personal income tax rates, inclusive of surtaxes and sub-central income taxes. The OECDwide average top statutory rate declined in each of the last three decades: from 66% in 1981 to 51% in 1990 and to 41% in 2008, when the crisis started. While the decline was most pronounced during the 1980s, reforms in the most recent decade prior to the crisis resulted in a further reduction of top statutory rates of 6% or more in 11 countries. The decline in the top statutory rate was not uniform across countries in the past decade. Some OECD countries, such as the Czech and the Slovak Republics and Hungary, moved to a single-rate personal income tax structure with their top statutory rates dropping from 32% to 15% in the Czech Republic, to 16% in Hungary and from 38% to 19% in the Slovak Republic. In Nordic countries, the top statutory rate also declined between the 1980s and 2013, from 85% to 56% in Sweden, from 65% to 60% in Denmark, from 70% to 51% in Finland, from 61% to 40% in Norway.
Finally, because of their relatively flat-rate structure, social security contributions redistributed very little. Where contribution ceilings were in place they may even have been regressive. As a result, social contributions did not play a major role in altering redistribution directly, despite their growing importance as a revenue source (up from an average of 8% of GDP in 1985 across OECD countries to almost 11% in 2005).
Designing policy packages to tackle high inequality and promote opportunities for all
Policy makers have a range of instruments and tools at hand to tackle rising inequality and promote opportunities for all. For such policy packages to be successful, solid trust in institutions and effective social dialogue are essential. Reducing the growing divide between rich and poor and promoting opportunities for all requires policy packages in four main areas.
Women's participation in economic life: governments need to pursue policies to eliminate the unequal treatment of men and women in the labour market and to remove barriers to female employment and career progression. This includes measures to increase the earning potential of women on low salaries and to address the glass ceiling.
Employment promotion and good quality jobs: policies need to emphasise access to jobs and labour market integration. The focus must be on policies for the quantity and quality of jobs; jobs that offer career and investment possibilities; jobs that are stepping stones rather than dead ends. Addressing labour market segmentation is an important element of enhancing job quality and tackling inequality. Skills and education: A focus on the early years, as well as on the needs of families with schoolchildren, is crucial in addressing socioeconomic differences in education. More must be done to provide youth with the skills they need to get a good start in the labour market. With a rapidly evolving economy, further efforts, with the close involvement of business and unions, should be made in promoting a continuous upgrading of skills during the working life.
Tax-and-transfer systems for efficient redistribution: Adequately designed redistribution via taxes and transfers is a powerful instrument for creating more equality and more growth. In recent decades, the effectiveness of redistribution weakened in many countries due to working-age benefits not keeping pace with real wages, and taxes becoming less progressive. Policies need to ensure that wealthier individuals but also multinational firms pay their share of the tax burden. large and persistent losses of low-income groups underlines the need for well-designed incomesupport policies and counter-cyclical social spending.
